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new cities each year for the next five years (Eck 2006 ). ACORN's basic strategy combines neighborhood-based organizing in low-to-moderate income communities of primarily AfricanAmerican and Latino residents with a broad array of pragmatic tactics but emphasizing direct action. The goal is to force targets, increasingly private sector ones but also public bodies, to address issues concerning their membership and win victories that build the organization and further broader objectives of social, economic, and political justice. Unlike most other community organizations, ACORN's model meshes dues-paying members in local chapters within a national organization. While issues and campaigns emanate from both the local and national levels, ACORN's recent dramatic growth and public visibility around economic justice issues, such as its living wage and predatory lending initiatives, derives from ACORN's federated structure which enables it to coordinate campaigns and mobilize local resources on a national scale (Atlas 2005; Atlas and Dreier 2003) . ACORN's multi-scale structure --as both a federation of local efforts and a national organization --which gives it more visibility and clout.
In their recent growth phase, a declining percentage of ACORN's funding derives from membership dues, though these remain critical. Membership dues now make up about 10% of ACORN's annual income; in the late 1970s it was 45% (Eck 2006; Delgado 1984) . ACORN helps fund the current organization as well as mobilize members around economic justice issues through corporate campaigns. During 2004 ACORN conducted a national campaign funded by the Marguerite Casey Foundation against the financial service practices of H&R Block, the largest commercial tax preparation corporation in the nation. The campaign, continuing ACORN's work around the "democratic control of finance and capital," (Kest 1994) targeted Block's use and promotion of high interest Refund Anticipation Loans (RALs) to recipients of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). It demonstrates the possibilities of community 5 organizing efforts that operate a multi-spatial organizational structure and mobilize a multi-tactic campaign built on direct action.
SELECTED DEBATES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COMMUNITY ORGANIZING
The case study engages a variety of issues in the expansive literature on social movements and community organizing. ACORN is a social movement organization (SMO) which explicitly sees itself as a product and continuation of the movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Building on this heritage, one of ACORN's distinctive repertoires is political protest; what they call "actions." While much of the social movement literature views protest as a form of collective action central to social movements, there is broad discussion about why social movement organizations prefer certain tactics over others (Meyer 2004; Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978 Tilly , 2004 . Jasper (1997) and others identify a relatively narrow "taste in tactics" in which groups draw upon familiar and limited tactics, despite the broad range of choices open to them, and become highly identified with one or two "core tactics" (Meyer 2004, 169) . Mayer and Zald (1973) see protest tactics as better represented in classical social movement organizations such as radical and civil rights efforts of the 1930s and 1960s rather than professional social movement organizations such as Common Cause or the National Organization of Women.
These organizations also found their impetus and animus in social movement roots but now, acting more like advocacy interest groups, pursue more normative strategies. Giugni (1999) thinks the question of whether disruptive or moderate tactics are more effective is one of the two major debates in the social movement literature. 1 The social movement literature acknowledges the influence of protest tactics on elites (della Porta and Diani 2006), public policy (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999) , the media (Gitlin 1980) , and participants (Epstein 1991) , as well as 6 the impact of protest on a broader social movement composed of a plurality of actors and initiatives forming "multi-organization fields" with multiple tactics (Diani 1997) .
Protest is a core tactic for ACORN, a central aspect of a tactical repertoire that includes a broad array of other tactics, from policy initiatives and negotiation to forming partnerships with former targets and striving for ownership and governance. ACORN is a large, complex organization that uses multiple tactics to achieve varied goals. Nevertheless, it is best known for its direct actions, its ability to turn people out at protests. ACORN uses protest in order to (1) empower its members, (2) build the organization, and (3) win campaigns. In their campaign against H&R Block, ACORN coordinated protests at the local and national level and added them to the tactics being used by other groups already challenging RALs, thereby complementing a pre-existing movement for financial justice.
Moving the debate from the literature on SMOs to that on urban community organizing situates ACORN's use of protest tactics within another academic and practice discourse. In the world of community-based initiatives direct action tactics are most associated with the work and writings of Saul Alinsky. Alinsky, building on labor and Left organizing models of the 1930s, believed that organization building, strong leadership, and innovative tactics were the recipe for winning victories, developing indigenous leaders, and building a mass people's organization. He proposed to "rub raw the resentments of people in the community" as a way to get them involved in the fight against established powers (Alinsky 1971, 116 (Boyte 1980; Horwitt 1992) . In the past decade, despite continued proliferation of new communitybased movement forms, Alinsky's model has fared less well, being criticized from various quarters (Stoecker and Stall 1997; Sen 2003; Williams 1996; Mayer 2003; Cloward and Piven 1999; Marquez 1993) . Most pertinent to this study are critiques that see such problem-oriented, conflict organizing as anachronistic (Kretzman and McKnight 1993; Eichler 1995; Beck and Eichler 2000) , out of sync with current interest in communitarian perspectives (Sandel 1988; Etzioni 1993 Etzioni , 1995 , and marginal when compared to the significant efforts of nonprofit organizations focused on building community, increasing social capital, enhancing local assets, and developing consensus in low income communities (Putnam 1996 ; Silverman 2004; Saegert, Thompson, and Warren 2001) .
Most of the social movement literature concludes that contextual factors heavily influence not only overall organizational success or failure but daily decisions such as tactical choice (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1994) . They shape whether disruptive or moderate tactics are deemed more effective or even considered. Contextual factors heavily influence the contemporary preference for community building strategies over more oppositional ones (Fisher and Shragge 2000; DeFilippis 2004) . Changing opportunity structures produce and allow for different types of political engagement. In the past few decades economic globalization, urban restructuring, and neoliberal politics has transformed urban neighborhoods and dominated 8 contemporary public policies and discourse, undermining communities and sanctifying "free market" responses to urban and national problems (Kuttner 1996; Heathcott 2005; Pendras 2002 ). Most community-based organizations adjusted to this new context, often reluctantly, with strategies and tactics that emphasize forming "relationships" and "partnerships" with business groups and foundations interested in strengthening the "voluntary sector" and "civil society." In general, they focus on more moderate approaches of building community, developing social capital, identifying and improving local assets, and encouraging consensus, not conflict, organizing (Putnam 1996; Silverman 2004; Kretzman and McKnight 1993; Eichler 1995) . In this context groups such as ACORN, which use multiple approaches but have direct action as their core tactic, seem out of step with current trend. The case study that follows suggests the contemporary relevance of conflict tactics. Opportunity structures may be more porous, more open to protest tactics, than either community organizing theory or practice reveals. Moreover, a federated national structure seems to strengthen protest tactics, enabling organizational demands to get quicker attention and response from corporate targets heretofore considered inaccessible.
METHOD OF STUDY
We used a case study research design (Yin 2003; Feagan, Orum and Sjoberg 1991) To broaden sources we interviewed H&R Block executives, consumer advocates, and social scientists studying EITC and RALs. Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim. Content was analyzed using the constant comparative method (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) . Since the variables were already established prior to the inquiry, themes and concepts were chosen as units of analysis. Themes and categories emerged quickly through open coding of the transcripts (Strauss & Corbin, 1990 (Beverly 2002) .
The EITC has received strong bipartisan support over the years because it requires recipients to work and is typically perceived as both anti-welfare and anti-poverty (Ventry 2001) .
At its best the policy intends to reduce income inequality and poverty, help the poor build assets, and promote work by targeting the working poor (Wu, Fox, Renaurt 2002 Federal program (Llobrera and Zahradnik 2004; Wu, Fox, and Renaurt 2002 (Wu, Fox, and Renaurt 2002) . Maag (2005, 5-6) argues that getting help to do taxes heavily influences whether an applicant files for and receives the EITC refund, especially among the poorer and less educated workers eligible for EITC, and therefore the assistance of a paid tax preparer "may be a good thing" for EITC filers.
Other evidence demonstrates that commercial tax preparers drain funds away from EITC recipients. A Brookings study (Berube, Kim, Forman and Burns 2002) calculates that approximately $1.75 billion of 1999 EITC refunds were diverted to commercial tax preparers with RALs as a major source of the cost. By definition refund anticipation loans are "high cost loans secured by and repaid directly from the proceeds of a consumer's tax refund from the Internal Revenue Service (Wu and Fox 2005, 3) . Because the RALs are short-term loans of a week or two (that is, the time until the loan is repaid via the taxpayer's refund), "fees for these loans translate into triple digit annualized interest rates" (Wu and Fox 2005, 3) . Times noted that in this and related suits "the main accusations are that lenders were mistreated when they were not told that Block has a 49.999 percent interest in the loans and receives a fee for each loan Beneficial makes" ("Judge Rejects" 2000).
In 1998 alone Block was the target of at least six law suits nationwide in federal and state courts (Kobliner 1998) ; by 2000 they had been sued no fewer than 22 times ("Judge Rejects" 2000) . When faced in the Texas case with a judge's order that would have cost Block $75 million for "intentional, willful, and deliberate" conduct by not disclosing the kickback scheme, Block settled out of court (Hallinan 2002, online; "Judge Rejects" 2000) . But not all suits came from aggrieved consumers. In JTH Tax v. H&R Block Eastern Tax Services, filed by John Hewitt, the co-founder of Jackson Hewitt and the founder and current president of Liberty Tax, respectively the second and third largest tax preparation companies in the United States, a federal judge found in 2001 "that H&R Block not only mislead consumers by advertising a RAL product as a "refund" but had engaged in bad faith in so doing. The court noted the many prior legal actions against H&R Block over similar misleading advertising" (Wu and Fox 2005) . It is through this court case that the term "refund anticipation loan" was coined. The case also noted a pattern of Block consenting to a decree in one state and then disregarding it in another, especially regarding its advertising and sales of "rapid refunds." publicity and increasing costs from these advocacy groups and lawsuits caused Block to consider reducing its emphasis on RALs. As a Block executive noted "Although we probably make more money from this product than anyone else in the category, as a percentage of our overall revenue we're nowhere top quartile. We're certainly the biggest player but this is not as important an activity to us as it is, frankly, to most people who are in our space as tax preparers, because we They sought to get the attention of both H&R Block and the media. Critical to the effort, ACORN recorded that the actions on January 13 th were covered by at least 64 media outlets.
On this first day of national protest, the actions at the various local events were scripted by the national campaign. In general, members went to Block offices and demanded to fax a complaint letter regarding RALs to the CEO of H&R Block. Members also chanted and handed out fliers informing Block employees as well as the public, inside and outside the office, about the problems with Block and RALs. One ACORN member described the action thusly, When we do go into the office…we go in there holding up signs that … you don't have to give them all this money…. You can get your tax return done free. And we ask that they fax a letter to the corporate office to let them know that we're against it…. Usually we have the media there so this is being aired and documented. And then when they do tell you [to leave], or they call the police…if they push at us we just back up but we don't kind of push them back or anything like that…. Our presence is intimidating enough…We just stick to the issue that we're there to represent and we just inform them and do what we have to do and then we leave (ACORN member 2004, interview) .
In actions throughout the nation protesters accused H&R BLOCK of "stealing from the community," engaging in "price gouging," and being a "rip off" (Steinback 2003) . They wore signs in Pittsburgh saying "H&R Block Steals" (Sabatini 2004 ). In Chicago they accused Block of "preying on the low-income population" (Shenoy 2004 ). In Passaic, New Jersey, where a big lighted sign in the window of the H&R Block office on Main Avenue said "Instant Money," nine people stood outside holding handwritten signs in Spanish and English demanding refunds for people they claimed were overcharged. They criticized the "instant money" offer as "deceptive, overpriced, and unfair" (Newman 2004 ).
ACORN set limits on the tactics used at the actions, pursuing both a tactical preference for direct action (Jasper 1997 ) and a balance with other political interventions (della Porta and being orchestrated again at the national level. Atlas and Dreier (2003, 4) argue, that "ACORN's most impressive attribute" is its federated, membership structure which enables it "to work simultaneously at the neighborhood, local, state and federal levels, so that its chapter members are always "in motion" on a variety of issues, and so that its local organizations can link up with their counterparts around the country to change national policy on key issues that can't be solved at the neighborhood or municipal level." Furthermore, the national federated structure enhanced organizational capacity beyond the local chapters. For example, in terms of the media attention generated by the campaign, the ACORN national office not only facilitated local press releases but also helped get the issue covered by national print and television media including NBC Dateline, ABC Nightline, The News Hour With Jim Lehrer, and CBS Evening News.
ACORN's ability to act on both a national and local level definitely had an impact on H&R
Block. This multi-spatial approach corresponds with recent scholarship on civil life, especially Skocpol (1999 Skocpol ( , 2003 , which emphasizes the benefits of membership-based efforts which operate as active, participatory locals of a national organization. Discipline may seem pejorative among new social movements (Epstein 1991) as well the value of protest tactics. As one member put her learning process,
What I like about ACORN is the direct approach, the action. Sometimes I didn't completely understand, like why don't they just talk to the people. Well, I've learned that being a member of ACORN that they have reached out and tried to talk with people that we have some issues with and they just completely ignore us. And so the one thing that we have as citizens, especially just regular working class citizens, we have the power to get with other people and just go out there and have demonstrations and actions. At first I didn't think they'd get anything done but it worked because people, especially in Indianapolis, they really don't like to be embarrassed like that ( In terms of member development, our interviews, focus groups, and participant observation revealed results counter to prevailing perspectives on community building. Recent literature on community-based organizations emphasizes the importance of community building approaches to resident empowerment and education and critiques protest tactics for failing to build significant identity and solidarity networks among participants (Boyte 2004; Fabricant and Fisher 2002) . Conflict strategies, especially ones developed outside the community, are said to do a poor job of participant education and development. The case study reveals more mixed initial results. As a staffer noted, "We had members who, at the beginning of their three months were like 'What's a RAL?' At the end [of the three months, they] stand up in front of a group of members and talk about RALs way better than I could. That wasn't because we did teach-ins or anything. We did a ton of actions ... people love it" (ACORN staff 2004, interview). At their best, ACORN actions seek to move the target, in this case H&R Block, and educate the community. In terms of member education and engagement, we observed that while some participants were personally affected by RALs, most were not. The campaign often took community residents beyond personal concerns to consider larger issues within their 22 communities, the economy and public policy. RALs were not "just hurting individual families," one articulate member noted, "but our entire economy because this is money that could be filtered back into our communities." (ACORN member 2004, Focus Group).
Regarding its impact on ACORN as a national organization, almost everyone interviewed was very positive about the speed of the campaign, the extent of media attention, the engagement of the locals and membership, and the resources it brought to ACORN. Overall, from ACORN's perspective, a well-orchestrated and coordinated national campaign of direct action empowered staff and members, strengthened the organization, and moved a Fortune 500 company to negotiate and support ACORN's work in poor and low-income communities. As ACORN put it in their annual report (2004):
Thousands of ACORN members across the country have been actively engaged in this campaign around increasing EITC and combating RALs, have discussed it in meetings, with their neighbors, and participated in actions. The H&R Block focus in specific has provided a powerful experience of participating in local actions, around problems facing your own neighborhood, but through coordination with similar actions taking place around the country, achieving a level of collective power sufficient to quickly force a major corporation to the table. Block's representative made this point in front of the 2,000-plus ACORN members gathered at the convention when he commented in his speech announcing the partnership that ACORN's activities had accomplished what years of reports and papers had never done in moving the company to make change.
Regarding its impact on H&R Block, while overall it is too soon to tell, some things are certain. Linder (2004) H&R Block and ACORN were negotiating. As noted earlier, Block was taken off guard by the January 13 th action. "When it started there was a bit of a scramble here.... Once the protests started we were up to speed fairly quickly, but really it wasn't anything we were prepared for.
Not something like that. Not protests at our door" (H&R Block executive 2005, interview).
Roth (2004a) concurs. "ACORN caught the company's attention when it staged Jan. 13 demonstrations at Block tax offices in 30 cities." That day H&R Block issued a public relations statement in their local newspaper "listing the steps the Kansas City company has taken to benefit low-income taxpayers" (Roth 2004a) . A few days later Block's vice president of community outreach and business development, made a public announcement noting, "We recognize our low-and moderate-income clients need financial education and financial literacy support" (Davis 2004 ). In private discussions within the company H&R Block decided early on to meet with ACORN. They admitted to being vulnerable to bad publicity during the tax season, said they were impressed with the scope of ACORN's actions, and concluded that ACORN was a legitimate representative of low-income community residents. A Block official, sounding as though he had read Skocpol (1999 Skocpol ( , 2003 , distinguished between Washington, D.C.-based national advocacy organizations, which he saw as without real legitimacy, and membershipbased organizations such as ACORN.
Well, I don't think anyone ever engaged us quite the way that ACORN did…We've been engaged in the past by essentially interest groups. ACORN by contrast was a membership-supported organization principally and last year ACORN had people out there for four hundred office protests, by people who look a lot like our clients…ACORN was the first of its type to engage us and it was a more credible, more convincing engagement. They know what they are talking about because they've lived it…. ACORN, by pounding on the door so to speak, got us to listen a little bit more carefully to our client's perspective (H&R Block executive 2005, interview).
In addition, Block concluded rather quickly, based on a canvass of other companies that had The results of the negotiations were announced at the ACORN national meeting on June 28 th in Los Angeles. "ACORN announced a three-year alliance with Block to help low-to midincome people better understand tax law," according to Roth (2004b) . "Block officials have declined to say how much they will invest in the program… Block will provide expertise and money to develop educational materials about tax credits and other tax saving mechanisms. Third-party consumer advocates, prior participants in the overall effort against predatory RALs, spoke strongly to the contribution ACORN made to the movement against H&R Block.
"It definitely made all the difference to have people standing in front of a Block office with signs that say "you guys are making predatory loans…. We could write all the reports and issue press releases we want but Block cares about its image and the idea of people standing outside their offices with protest signs, I think was pretty effective" (Consumer Advocate 2004, interview).
Singletary (2005) ACORN's work must be contextualized in the broader anti-RALs campaign; to view its campaign as the sole agent of change would decontextualize ACORN's efforts and miss the complex structure and processes of social movements. Without the prior efforts which disclosed and framed the problem, legitimated and publicized the issue, and attacked and hurt conclusion. For Taylor and Silver (2003, 169) their study of the Community Reinvestment Act revealed that "Activism is not passé; it is essential. Without activism, our society becomes less democratic and less just. This is true in many arenas, but especially in the fight for economic justice and equal access to credit and capital." Squires (2003a) and others concur. Dreier (2003, 210) in his analysis of predatory lending concludes that "The twenty-first century will certainly see a growing concentration of power in a smaller and smaller number of financial services conglomerates, which will present daunting challenges…. Only groups that have a national base such as ACORN… will have any reasonable chance to challenge the financial services giants." Hartman (2004, 210) , preferring federal policy initiatives, applauds ACORN's work around the earlier campaign against Household Finance for predatory lending but wonders whether they will be able to find the resources to mount it nationally and whether "confrontational tactics will produce a backlash." Perhaps it already has. As a senior vice president from Bank of America put it: "I don't want to hear one more community group tell me something negative and then ask me for $400,000 a week later. That doesn't work anymore" (Hartman 2004, 210 ).
Hartman and others are correct. Addressing economic exploitation ingrained in the subprime financial markets and contemporary forms of unregulated capitalism will require more than community organizing or the campaign of a single organization, even a national one.
ACORN is working in coalitions with other groups advocating for federal and state-wide RALs legislation, with some modest recent successes in Connecticut and California. Like most of the large community organizing networks, ACORN prefers, when it has enough clout, to work autonomously, but increasingly in ongoing campaigns that ACORN joins, such as the RAL campaign, or in campaigns where they seek to have greater impact, such as living wage initiatives or electoral efforts, they increasingly work with other groups.
This case study should encourage theoreticians, researchers, and practitioners to reconsider the choice of protest tactics in community-based organizations as a means of moving vulnerable targets, drawing public attention to neglected issues, building the organization, and mobilizing and sustaining membership. It should also direct attention to the impact of adding protest tactics to existing campaigns; our research reveals direct action was an addition that complemented rather than undermined other tactical repertoires.
This case study should also encourage an increased examination of ACORN by those interested in urban social movements and community-based initiatives. Unlike most current community-based efforts, ACORN has a broader perspective that seeks, as Koehler and Wissen (2003, 949) put it in a broader discussion of urban social movements, to "fight the destructive influences which neoliberal globalization exerts on everyday life" and politicize these contradictions through organized "urban social conflict" ACORN would not use that language, but they understand the power of multinational corporations under contemporary economic globalization, and that it requires a broad scale of activism, at least a national organization that can hold actions in more than 50 cities as they did with Block. Their strategy to target large corporations, not public agencies or officials, reflects ACORN's understanding of the shift in power and resources under contemporary policies away from the public sector in general and city officials in particular. (Weir, Wolman and Swanstrom 2005) . Moreover, ACORN's local as well as national capacity capitalizes on the virtues and helps transcend the limits of small scale, community activism while at the same time addressing some of the key dilemmas inherent in centralized, large scale advocacy organizations Atlas 2005) . Moreover, the national structure complements their protest tactics. If ACORN was embedded solely in a single community with a focus solely on that community, not looking beyond community borders for either causes or solutions to local problems, then ongoing protest tactics within the communitywhat Jane Mansbridge called "adversarial democracy" -would prove counterproductive. But in a national organization focused on both local and national campaigns, in which its broader practice and focus make it less limited by community values or longterm relationships, in which they encourage an understanding that community problems are almost always the result of policies and politics from outside the community, in an organization that probably fights more for the general interests of poor and low-income people than it does the specific interests of individual community members, protest tactics, in combination with other approaches, can work well.
Of course, as noted above, ACORN uses a broad array of tactics: negotiation, partnerships, service delivery, program development and administration and protest. Protest does not work equally well in every case or place. Not every target, private or public, responds as H&R Block did. Throughout ACORN's history boisterous, in-your-face, confrontational tactics have consistently alienated officials and business leaders, causing them to react harshly to the organization (Delgado 1984; Swarts 2002) . Even within ACORN, especially in its early years, members who do not like the actions drop out of the organization or simply do not participate in the actions. In sites where they have a long-term presence, such as New York City and Chicago, their range of tactics befits a complex social change organization. But even there, conflict and contestation, mobilizing members to protest against local abuses as well as injustices and inequalities originating from outside the community, is central to the organization. Protest is not their only tactic just as protest is not only used in national campaigns. But the mix -direct actions orchestrated at a national level against targets unlikely to be moved by any tactics at the single community level -seems especially appropriate. At the least this case study suggests that direct action as a tactic, ACORN as an organization, and the model of a national organization of active community-based chapters appear worthy of further study.
